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We use replicator dynamics to study an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game with 
memory. In this study, we investigate the characteristics of all 32 possible strategies 
with a single-step memory by observing the results when each strategy encounters 
another one. Based on these results, we define similarity measures between the 32 
strategies and perform a network analysis of the relationship between the strategies 
by constructing a strategies network. Interestingly, we find that a win-lose circulation, 
like rock-paper-scissors, exists between strategies and that the circulation results 
from one unusual strategy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a great deal interdisciplinary research 
has been performed crossing many different fields. 
Specifically, various methods developed in 
statistical physics have been introduced to 
understand the underlying mechanisms that 
successfully describe social, biological, and 
ecological phenomena, such as evolutionary biology 
[1, 2], agent-based models [3], voter models [4], 
and epidemic spreading [5]. Game theory is one of 
the prevalent topics in complexity studies, and 
typical examples are prisoner’s dilemma, chicken 
games, public goods games, snowdrift games, and 
hawk-dove games [6-8]. 
 Among the various examples, the prisoner’s 
dilemma (PD) is the best known model [7, 8]. Two 
criminals are arrested and imprisoned. Because each 
prisoner is in solitary confinement, they have no 
way to deliver a message to or talk with each other. 
The police offer each prisoner a separate Faustian 
bargain. If one confesses and the other denies the 
crime, the confessor will be set free, and the other 
will serve three years in prison. If both confess, they 
will each serve two years in prison. On the other 
hand, if both deny the crime, each will serve only 
one year in prison. Since confession is always better 
than denial for each prisoner independently of 
whatever the partner’s choice, both prisoners may 
confess. This is called the prisoner’s dilemma 
because the two-year sentence for both is the worst 
case possibility for the local optimum of self- 
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Table  1. Payoff matrix for the player (opponent) 
in a PD game. 
 opponent 
C D 
player 
C 3 ( 3 ) 0 ( 5 ) 
D 5 ( 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 
interested prisoners. The global optimum is both 
denying the crime, with each serving only one year.  
However, if this game is repeated, what will 
happen? This is called the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma game (IPDG) [7]. The results show very 
different patterns from a single-iteration game. 
Sometimes, both prisoners deny the crime by 
making promises to each other in advance of getting 
caught. In some cases, one confesses and the other 
denies, like showing altruism depending on the 
details of rule. In this paper, we study the IPDG 
with a one-step memory size by using replicator 
dynamics [8, 9]. In section II, all 32 possible 
strategies are characterized and analyzed by 
applying a similarity measure. Based on the results 
of one-to-one games among the 32 strategies, we 
reveal the network structures between the strategies 
in Section III. Interestingly, a win-lose circulation 
exists between strategies. A summary of the results 
and discussions are addressed in the last section. 
II. METHODS 
For simple notation, we denote denial with the 
capital letter ‘C’ meaning “cooperation”, and 
confession with the letter ‘D’ meaning “defect”, as 
conventionally used in game theory. If both players 
(prisoners) cooperate, they both receive a reward (R) 
for cooperation. If one defects while the other 
cooperates, then the defector receives a temptation 
(T) while the partner receives a sucker’s payoff (S). 
If both players defect, both players receive 
punishment (P). For convenience, we set the 
payoffs at T=5, R=3, S=0, and P=1, as shown in 
Table 1, where the condition T > R > P > S must 
hold for the game to be a PD game. Additionally, 
2R > T + S  is required to keep the mutual 
cooperation from alternating between cooperation 
and defection in the iterative game. Depending on 
the relation between the values of T, R, P, and S, 
the snowdrift game, the chicken game, and the 
hawk-dove game branch off [8]. 
1. Thirty-two Possible Strategies with a 
Memory Size One 
The dependences of the characterized reaction 
patterns of players in the IPDG on former results 
(histories) are called “strategies.” Because we 
consider the case of memory size one, i.e., only the 
previous step is remembered, we have five choices 
for each strategy. First, we have to consider the four 
possible previous results: both the player and the 
opponent cooperate in the previous step (denoted as 
|CC|), |CD| representing the case in which the player 
cooperates but the opponent defects, |DC|, and |DD|. 
Added to these, we should also consider the initial 
choice. Therefore, the number of all possible 
strategies is 25 = 32 when taking two possible 
players’ choices into account. If the convenient 
bitwise representation in Ref. 10 is borrowed, each 
strategy is coded by five bits, 𝑎0|𝑎1𝑎2𝑎3𝑎4. The 
first bit, 𝑎0, is the initial choice, and bit 𝑎1 is the 
reaction for |CC|. Likewise, 𝑎2 is for |CD|, 𝑎3 for 
|DC|, and 𝑎4  for |DD|. For example, the most 
famous strategy ‘tit for tat’ (TFT) is C|CDCD, 
which is the coding for the behavior in which the 
player first cooperates and then copies the 
opponent’s choice [7, 8]. We assign a decimal 
number for each strategy by interpreting the binary 
notation ‘C’ as 1 and ‘D’ as 0 and by reading it in 
the reverse way. TFT corresponds to the 11th 
strategy because the binary number 01011(2) is 11 in 
the decimal system. Other examples are ‘grim 
trigger’ (GT) and ‘Pavlov.’ The GT player 
cooperates first; then, if the opponent defects once, 
the player never forgives [8] . The bitwise 
representation C|CDDD describes GT, and 
corresponds to 00011(2), i.e., the 3rd strategy. Pavlov 
strategy is ‘win-stay-lose-shift,’ whose bitwise  
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Table  2. Detailed behaviors of the 32 strategies. 
Strategy 
number 
Bitwise 
representation 
Strategy 
nickname Behavior pattern description 
0 D|DDDD All D Always defect 
1 C|DDDD All D FC First cooperate; after then always defect 
2 D|CDDD All D Always defect 
3 C|CDDD Grim trigger First cooperate, then if the opponent defects once, player never forgives 
4 D|DCDD All D Always defect 
5 C|DCDD  First cooperate; then only cooperate for |CD| 
6 D|CCDD All D Always defect 
7 C|CCDD All C Always cooperate 
8 D|DDCD Swindler FD Always defect except in a |DC| situation 
9 C|DDCD Swindler First cooperate; then always defect except in a |DC| situation 
10 D|CDCD Tit for tat FD First defect; then copy the opponent’s choice 
11 C|CDCD Tit for tat First cooperate; then copy the opponent’s choice 
12 D|DCCD  First defect; if the opponent’s choice is different, cooperate 
13 C|DCCD  First cooperate; if the opponent’s choice is different, cooperate 
14 D|CCCD Blinder First defect; if the opponent cooperates once, always cooperate 
15 C|CCCD All C Always cooperate 
16 D|DDDC  First defect; only cooperate for |DD| 
17 C|DDDC  First cooperate; only cooperate for |DD| 
18 D|CDDC Pavlov FD First defect; if the result is bad, flip the choice 
19 C|CDDC Pavlov First cooperate; if the result is bad, flip the choice 
20 D|DCDC Tree frog FD First defect; then choose choice opposite your opponent’s 
21 C|DCDC Tree frog First cooperate; then choose choice opposite your opponent’s 
22 D|CCDC Prodigal son First defect; if once punished, always cooperate 
23 C|CCDC All C Always cooperate 
24 D|DDCC CD repeater First cooperate; then change choice independently of the opponent’s 
25 C|DDCC DC repeater First defect; then change choice independently of the opponent’s 
26 D|CDCC Punisher FD First defect; defect only for the |CD| situation 
27 C|CDCC Punisher First cooperate; defect only for the |CD| situation 
28 D|DCCC Rebel FD First defect; defect only for the |CC| situation 
29 C|DCCC Rebel First cooperate; defect only for the |CC| situation 
30 D|CCCC All C FD First defect; then always cooperate 
31 C|CCCC All C Always cooperate 
representation is C|CDDC, the 19th strategy [9]. 
All 32 possible strategies are summarized in Table 2. 
As one can see in Table 2, similarities exist 
among the 32 strategies. For example, 0, 2, 4, and 6 
strategies are D|DDDD, D|CDDD, D|DCDD, and 
D|CCDD in the bitwise representation. Even though 
the bitwise representation (genotype) is different, all 
of these strategies only repeat ‘D.’ We call it ‘All D’ 
in their reaction (phenotype). Similarly, there are 4 
genotypes for ‘All C,’ 7, 15, 23, and 31, and 2 
genotypes for ‘CD repeater,’ 24, and ‘DC repeater,’ 
25, which are effectively the same. We remove the  
seven effectively similar strategies later for analysis 
of the relation between the remaining 25 strategies. 
In order to compare the characteristics of the 32 
strategies, we calculate the cumulative points of 
each strategy against the others over 24 rounds 
based on the payoff matrix shown in Table 1, 
discarding the first 24 transient rounds. The 
resulting cumulative points are visualized in Fig. 1.  
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Fig. 1. (Color online) Cumulative payoff results 
for a one-to-one iterated game.  
Clearly, one can see that effectively similar 
strategies exist. Using this cumulative point matrix, 
we measure the similarity between the 32 strategies 
by adopting the cosine inner product [11] and the 
Pearson correlation [12], which are the simplest 
ways to measure the correlation, to get a similarity 
between the strategies. The results using the cosine 
inner product provide results that are almost the 
same as that provided by using the Pearson 
correlation. 
2. Replicator Dynamics 
For the 25 non-duplicated strategies of the IPDG, 
we perform a replicator dynamics (RD) simulation, 
which is widely used to find evolutionarily stable 
strategies in evolutionary game dynamics [8, 9]. 
The population density of strategy i is denoted by 𝑥𝑖, 
and its time derivative is given by the following 
equation: 
𝑥?̇? = 𝑥𝑖�𝑓𝑖(𝑥) − 𝑓(̅𝑥)�,   𝑓(̅𝑥) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑓𝑗(𝑥)𝑛𝑗=1 ,              (1) 
where 𝑓𝑖  is the fitness (payoff) of strategy i for a 
given population condition 𝑥. The above equation 
describes a relative growth rate of a strategy that is 
proportional to its relative payoff derived from the  
 
Fig. 2. (Color online) Typical examples of 
replicator dynamics simulations: (a) 1% of Swindler 
FD (8) invades 99% of All C (31) and then reaches 
the equilibrium point, and (b) 1% of tit for tat (11) 
invades 99% of All D and then overwhelms the 
majority. 
average over the whole population. In this 
simulation, we adopt a first-order Euler method to 
solve an ordinary differential equation with a time-
change dt = 0.01. For each time step, in order to 
get the average fitness, we discard the transient 
payoffs over 24 rounds. 
For the 25 non-duplicated strategies, we perform 
extensive numerical simulations with two initial 
conditions. One is starting the 25 strategies in a 
homogeneous population and the other is one-to-
one invading condition, 1% of the population of a 
certain strategy invades into a 99% defensive major 
strategy. Figure 2 shows the usual examples of a 
one-to-one invading game. In the case of replicator 
dynamics of the two strategies, one can easily solve 
the ordinary differential equations analytically. If 
we define fitness 𝐹𝐼 ≡ 𝑃𝐼𝐼 −  𝑃𝐷𝐼  and 𝐹𝐷 ≡ 𝑃𝐷𝐷 − 𝑃𝐼𝐷 , where 𝑃ij  means the average payoff that 
strategy i gets from the strategy j, Eq. (1) gives 
𝑥?̇?  =  −(𝐹𝐼  +  𝐹𝐷) � 𝑥𝐼 − 𝐹𝐷𝐹𝐼+𝐹𝐷� 𝑥𝐼(𝑥𝐼 − 1),  (2) 
where the subscripts I and D represent invading and 
defensive strategies, respectively. According to the 
signs and the amplitudes of 𝐹𝐼 and 𝐹𝐷, Eq. (2) has  
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Fig. 3. (Color online) Four possible cases of 
replicator dynamics for one-to-one invading games: 
(a) stable extinction, (b) bistable extinction 
depending on the initial condition, (c) balanced 
equilibrium, (d) overwhelming dominant cases. 
  
Fig. 4. (Color online) Maximum spanning tree 
graph based on the similarity measure. 
four significant scenarios: (a) stable extinction, (b) 
initial-condition-dependent an unstable point, (c) 
balanced equilibrium, and (d) overwhelming 
conquest, as shown in Fig. 3. We check that our 
numerical simulations agree with theoretical 
expectations.  
III. RESULTS 
1. Strategy Similarity Map Using a Maximum 
Spanning Tree 
Based on the cosine similarity measure of the 
matrix in Fig. 1, we construct a maximum spanning 
tree graph incorporating Prim’s algorithm [13], as 
shown in Fig. 4. In this figure, cooperative 
strategies are well separated from treacherous  
 
 Fig. 5. (Color online) Strategy network. Blue and 
red nodes mean first moves are cooperative and 
defeatist respectively, black edges are the maximum 
spanning tree based on similarity measure, and 
orange directed edges are results of one-to-one 
replicator dynamics. The size of the node is 
proportional to 25(1+𝐿) + 𝑊3  , where L is the number of 
losses and W is the number of wins. 
strategies. The boundary strategy is the ‘CD 
repeater,’ number 24, which is the “neutral strategy” 
ignoring the opponent’s choice. The effectively 
similar strategies mentioned above are clustered 
well in the tree graph. One may wonder why GT is 
classified as treacherous in Fig. 5. Even though GT 
cooperates first and continues the cooperation 
before the opponent defects, contrary to TFT, GT 
never forgives if the opponent defects once. Due to 
the consecutive defects, GT is classified as a 
treacherous strategy like the strategy all D except 
for the first cooperation. 
2. Numerical Simulation for a Homogeneous 
Population 
Putting the 25 non-duplicated strategies 
uniformly in the RD system, we run the simulation. 
The numerical results smoothly reach an 
equilibrium state without any rough oscillation. The 
most successful strategies are GT (number 3, 
65.5%), TFT (number 11, 14.9%), Pavlov (number 
19, 11.5%), Punisher (number 27, 7.5%), and All C 
(number 31, 0.6%). These results are similar to 
them reported in Ref. 10, even though the final  
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 Fig. 6. (Color online) Win-lose circulation. 
population densities are a little different. The other 
strategies are less than 1% or extinct. Because the 
seven removed strategies are All C, All D, and CD 
repeater, the simulation results are not much 
different from there in Ref. 10. 
3. Win-lose Network Structure between 25 
Strategies 
From the theoretical calculation and numerical 
simulation of replicator dynamics between two 
strategies, we express all win-lose relations between 
two strategies among the 25 strategies, as shown in 
Fig. 5. The heads of the orange arrows indicate that 
one strategy always overwhelmingly dominates the 
other strategy. The black back-bone is the similarity 
map in Fig. 4. The color of the nodes represents the 
first move of the strategy, ‘C’ in blue and ‘D’ in red. 
The sizes of the nodes denote the estimated powers 
of the strategies based on the number of wins and 
losses. Similar to the above result, the TFT and the 
GT still have a strong influence, even in one-to-one 
games.  
From these entangled arrows, we find an 
unexpected win-lose circulation, like rock-paper-
scissors. Figure 6 shows the possible win-lose 
circulation taken from the win-lose network 
structure. Interestingly, this win-lose circulation is 
sustained by the node of the strategy 5, C|DCDD, 
which is a strategy we cannot easily characterize. 
This strategy only cooperates when its previous 
choice is ‘C’ and the opponent’s is ‘D’; otherwise, it 
is always defection. If we remove strategy 5, all the 
win-lose circulation loops collapse. This win-lose 
circulation can make the system oscillate.  
 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we investigate the relation between 
32 strategies of an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game 
with a memory size 1. From the strategy similarity 
map, we find that there are seven effectively similar 
strategies. After eliminating these 7 strategies by 
using the results of one-to-one iterated games, we 
construct a win-lose network structure between the 
25 strategies, and find interesting win-lose 
circulation loops. Strategy 5, C|DCDD, is found to 
play a key role in this win-lose circulation. Because 
win-lose circulation loops, like rock-paper-scissors, 
exist, one can expect oscillating population 
densities under certain condition. However, when 
the simulation starts from a homogeneous 
population density, we cannot find any oscillating 
behavior in the population density because strategy 
5 quickly decays. If one chooses the three strategies 
that make a cyclic triangle from Fig. 6, one can 
observe the oscillation of the population density for 
the proper initial condition. We suggest a further 
analysis of these oscillating behaviors for a future 
work. 
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